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Abstract The calamitous consequences of 2017 Hurricane
Maria for the Caribbean island of Dominica highlighted the
acute and increasing susceptibility of the region to disas-
ters. Despite increasing international attention to disaster
risk reduction, recovery from hazard events can be espe-
cially lengthy and difficult for small island developing
states. In this article, we build on existing understandings
of disaster risk as a physical and social condition, showing
that historical processes are fundamental to understanding
how conditions of risk emerge and persist over time. We
take an integrated approach to analyzing the drivers of risk
accumulation, using the example of Dominica, where
processes set in motion during the colonial period have
shaped the location of people and assets, the degree to
which they might be harmed, the societal repercussions of
that harm and the prospects for recovery. We focus on the
underlying economic vulnerabilities and physical exposure
to hazards created by agricultural, economic, and social
practices, and successive disaster responses that have
constrained recovery. Uncovering these historical drivers
and persistent issues, elucidates lessons for pursuing a
more resilient development trajectory, including through
the promotion of economic restructuring and diversifica-
tion, and land reform.
Keywords Dominica  Historical trajectories  Natural
hazards  Resilience  Risk exposure  Small island
developing states
1 Introduction
On 18 September 2017 Hurricane Maria, a category 5
hurricane, swept across the Caribbean island of Dominica.
Its passage left catastrophic destruction in its wake—80%
of the population was affected and more than 90% of
buildings were damaged or destroyed—as well as 31
people dead and 37 missing (ACAPS 2018). This disaster
occurred just two years after 2015 Tropical Storm Erika,
which was categorized as a less intense storm but resulted
in 11 fatalities, 22 people missing, and approximately 10%
of the population was affected (Government of the Com-
monwealth of Dominica 2015). Recent disasters have also
imposed significant costs on the Dominica economy,
leading to major declines in GDP growth: 2007 Hurricane
Dean resulted in damage equivalent to 58% of GDP;
Tropical Storm Erika resulted in damage equivalent to 90%
of GDP; and for Hurricane Maria total loss and damage has
been estimated to be 224% of GDP (Government of the
Commonwealth of Dominica 2015; ACAPS 2018). The
impacts of these intense storms were disastrous; but as with
all disasters, the drivers of risk are social, political, and
cultural, as well as physical. Across the Caribbean, a series
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of shortsighted policy and investment decisions have led to
an accumulation of exposure and vulnerability to hazards
in these islands. High levels of debt and dependency on
external finance, economic instability, insularity, remote-
ness, and environmental fragility limit the development
potential of small Caribbean islands, as do the repeated and
devastating impacts of disasters (Wilkinson et al. 2016). As
Benson et al. (2001) note in a report on the economic
impacts of contemporary disasters in Dominica, some
sectors and subsectors are more vulnerable to hazards than
others and measures can be taken to reduce the vulnera-
bility of the Dominica economy and thus contribute to
sustainable growth.
Hurricane Maria was one of a long succession of hazard
events that have impacted Dominica, with effects that can
be traced, at least in part, to actions and processes rooted in
colonial and postcolonial history. An historical analysis can
help to reveal the reasons why risk has been allowed to
accumulate (and where exposure has been successfully
dealt with). We argue that by the time of independence on
3 November 1978, Dominica was already on a develop-
ment trajectory of high exposure and economic vulnera-
bility that was difficult to alter. This article sheds light on
these historical events to help explain why Dominica faces
significant challenges in pursuing social, economic, and
sustainable development after Hurricane Maria.
2 Dominica: The Context
The Caribbean island of Dominica (capital city: Roseau)
occupies around 750 km2 of land. The highest elevation is
Morne Diablotins (1447 m), part of a chain of rainforest-
covered volcanic peaks that creates a central, steeply dis-
sected mountain range, from which 365 rivers originate
(Fig. 1). This precipitous topography creates unsta-
ble slopes, strong orographic variation in rainfall and a
steep marine shelf. At 15180N and 61230W (Roseau),
Dominica also lies under the influence of the intertropical
convergence zone, with a shift in wind patterns and broadly
increased rainfall during the July to October hurricane
season.
Consequently, and in common with many other Small
Island Developing States (SIDS) worldwide, Dominica is
prone to a wide variety of natural hazards, including hur-
ricanes, intense rainfall, slope instability, volcanic erup-
tions, seismic activities, and tsunamis (Wilkinson et al.
2016). Since Columbus’s ship first encountered the island
in 1493, impacts from some 177 intense storms or hurri-
canes, and four earthquakes or earthquake swarms have
been recorded (Table 1). About 70% of the island’s total
land base is unsuitable for modern agriculture, primarily
due to the risk of sheet erosion or waterlogging (Burke and
Lovell 2000).
Decisions taken by the colonial powers (by the French
and then the British) have played a significant role in
shaping population distribution and growth patterns, land
use, and recovery from hazardous events (Tables 1 and 2).
Historians infer that the pre-Columbian (Kalinago) popu-
lation lived mainly in small dispersed settlements, close to
fertile land and relatively sheltered from hazards (Burke
and Lovell 2000), locations that would also have afforded
better protection from hurricanes (Schwartz 2015). French
and English occupation, however, shifted settlements to
locations with good external trading routes and strategic
and defensive advantages.
The critical moments of relevance to hazard exposure in
Dominica’s history are summarized in Table 2. Dominica
officially remained a neutral territory until the Treaty of
Paris in 1763, after which the land was ceded to Britain,
surveyed and a map produced—the Byres Map (Byres
1776). The revenue from selling off parcels of land was
retained by the British Crown and not reinvested in
Dominica; it was expected that profit and capital growth
from land use would drive investment in the island’s
infrastructure and economic development.
Under British rule, the economic history of Dominica
was characterized by an economically dominant export
crop of one kind or another (Yankey 1969, p. 138 quoted in
Nelson 2010, p. 224). In this article we argue that the
impacts of hazards, diseases, and other shocks on these
dominant crops, alongside the land use and labor practices
created by this economic model, have all contributed to
Dominica’s underdevelopment and high levels of disaster
risk. Disease, natural hazards, and other economic stresses
reduced employment opportunities, promoting a drift
toward marginal settlement on Crown Land and on the
edges of larger towns; and deficiencies in governance
meant that insufficient action was taken to counteract these
pressures. We therefore take an integrated approach to
analyzing the historical, physical, social, and political dri-
vers of risk accumulation, in order to understand the
important consequent barriers to the reduction of risk. In
the following sections, we develop an understanding of the
historical factors that have shaped Dominica’s develop-
ment trajectory, focusing on the underlying economic
vulnerabilities and physical exposure to hazards created by
events and decisions taken during the colonial period, and
their impact on post-disaster recovery.
This article follows a now well-established understand-
ing of disaster risk as both a social and physical condition,
in which the chances of being exposed to, and adversely
affected by, hazards are generated at least in part by the
decisions, actions, behaviors, and policies adopted by
individuals and institutions, many of which have deep-
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seated structural roots (see, for example, Hewitt 1983;
Bankoff et al. 2004; Collins 2009). Contributions from a
cross-disciplinary body of scholarship on disaster research
have emphasized the importance of understanding how
these structures and conditions emerge over time, and that
many are the product, at least in part, of drivers set in train
during colonial and postcolonial times (Pelling 2003;
Wisner et al. 2004; Lewis and Kelman 2010). Relatively
few studies, however, have concentrated their focus on
these long-term historical roots of disaster risk. Work such
as this that traces drivers of risk and their dynamics over
periods of three centuries and more of historical influence
remains rare. Notable exceptions include analyses of Peru’s
five-hundred-year earthquake (Oliver-Smith and Hoff-
man1999) and drivers of cyclone risk since the 17th cen-
tury in the Mascarene Islands (Garnier and Desarthe 2013).
Much of the broader scholarship on Caribbean devel-
opment pathways elucidates how the colonial experience
across various islands has been translated into contempo-
rary patterns of economic, social, and political develop-
ment (Mandle 1982; Bishop 2013; Dookeran 2015). We
seek to extend that tradition of analysis more specifically to
Caribbean disasters research, underlining that historical
processes are fundamental to understanding not only how
conditions of risk emerge, but also how societal inertia
causes them to persist over time. Using the example of
Dominica, we demonstrate how processes much earlier
than independence in 1978 have shaped where people and
assets are located, the degree to which they might be
harmed, the societal repercussions of that harm, and the
prospects for recovery. We argue that uncovering these
historical drivers and persistent issues also shows how they
might be avoided to improve the likelihood of progress
towards resilient development, particularly at a time when
Dominica is engaged in development programs aimed at
‘‘building back better.’’
Fig. 1 Topographic map of
Dominica showing the capital
city Roseau and other selected
settlements, ports and airports,
and main roads. The ‘‘King’s
Three Chains’’ (Table 2) is not
shown as it is only 66 yards or
60.35 m wide but follows entire
coast. Source Caribbean
Handbook on Risk Management
(CHARIM) geonode for
Dominica (http://charim-
geonode.net/) and Reading
(1986)
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3 Methodology
While there is no direct causal link between decisions taken
more than 200 years ago and disaster impacts in Dominica
today, historical analysis generates structural knowledge
about disaster risk and helps to identify far-reaching and
long-term societal mechanisms, specific types of processes
and recurrent structures for dealing with disaster (Schenk
2015). The analysis of decisions taken over a long period of
time with regard to labor, land use, the market economy,
and disaster recovery, contributes to our understanding of
present conditions of risk. Data were collected and ana-
lyzed by a multidisciplinary team of social and physical
scientists with expertise in disaster and climate risk gov-
ernance; geological hazards and interdisciplinary approa-
ches to risk reduction; vulnerability and adaptation to
environmental hazards and climate change; and colonial
and maritime history and cultural encounter. Specialized
disciplinary teams focused on political, social, and eco-
nomic themes over three time periods (1627–1783;
1813–1838; and 1945–1979) and on physical events (which
spanned the entire historical, and where possible, prehis-
torical record). Research drew on both primary and sec-
ondary data sources, using material from historical archives
and contemporary literature databases. Historical data were
obtained through archival research in the UK (predomi-
nantly from The British Library collections and The
National Archives) and Dominica (from The National
Archives Unit) between November 2016 and July 2017, in
addition to an extensive web-based search of peer reviewed
and grey literature. Where possible, researchers consulted
original sources such as parliamentary papers and records,
contextualized with relevant critical sources from the his-
toriography of Dominica. The research team then com-
pared key moments for each of the themes and identified
the decisions taken around land use and agriculture, land
tenure, capital investments, post-disaster aid, and the Car-
ibbean development priorities for colonial governments.
These decisions elucidated best the influence of early
decision making and colonial governance on current deci-
sion making (global and local) and land occupancy patterns
relevant to disaster risk reduction. This complexity is best
illustrated through a case study and we chose recovery
from the hurricane of 1834 as a pivotal event, representing
a disaster in the middle of the colonial times, when
recovery coincided with other important social and eco-
nomic changes linked to emancipation. Findings from this
research were shared and verified through a series of dis-
cussions with local historians, academics, and disaster risk
stakeholders during a visit to Dominica in March 2017.
Further demographic, economic, and agricultural data were
then synthesized to provide a more complete record of
population growth and development activities during the
study period (1627–present).
4 Disaster Risk Accumulation in Dominica
In the following section we focus on the differing drivers
that contributed towards the accumulation of vulnerabili-
ties to future hazardous events in Dominica. These drivers
both influence the outcomes of contemporary hazardous
events and drive decision making that amplifies the impacts
of future events. We provide a synoptic account of each of
these historical drivers (underlying economic vulnerability,
social and cultural drivers that increased exposure to risk,
and weak governance and disaster response) while also
using the case study of response to the 1834 hurricane to
exemplify the interaction between these elements.
4.1 Underlying Economic Vulnerability
The history of Dominica since the late 17th century was
characterized by successive (failed) attempts by the British
colonial powers to establish dominant large-scale agricul-
tural production that would provide income for the colony
and home nation and enable the island to flourish (sum-
marized in Table 2). During the colonial period, despite
various thwarted attempts to rectify the situation, the
island’s economy remained structurally weak with low
levels of productivity, and high susceptibility to external
economic shocks and hazards. Decisions taken regarding
land ownership and agricultural and road infrastructure
investments deepened this underlying economic
vulnerability.
Dominica was ceded to the British by the French in 1763
and, at that point, grouped administratively with other
Caribbean Islands (and regrouped again in 1871, Table 2).
The ‘‘ceded’’ islands (Dominica, St. Vincent and the Gre-
nadines, Grenada and Tobago) were geographically and
culturally distinctive and physically well dispersed from
one another and other colonized Caribbean territories at
that time (for example, Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and
Nevis, Antigua and Montserrat). Correspondence through
this time period demonstrates the uneasy ‘‘fit’’ the local
legislature felt with being in this grouping (Hamilton 1894;
Naftel 1898). Yet, the remote colonial system of gover-
nance meant that a homogenous approach to development
was often adopted across islands, despite particular rec-
ommendations generated by locally and regionally com-
missioned reports (Table 2). Typically, when an approach
appeared to generate income in one place, the approach
was modified for all, rather than considering the distinctive
geographical, resource, and social opportunities repre-
sented by each island.
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Table 2 Historical developments and policies concerning land use, infrastructural development, governance, and social attitudes in Dominica,
1627–1978
Time Events and Policies Sources
1627 Dominica is a Kalinago stronghold and base from which to launch attacks on
European colonists
Honychurch (1995)
1686–1763 Following continued battles for control between the British, French, and
Kalinagos, Dominica is declared neutral territory. The French develop
coffee and cocoa plantations, with some English habitation
Honychurch (2017), Murdoch (1984)
1763 Dominica ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Paris after the 7-year war
(1756–1763)
Murdoch (1984)
1763–1778 UK surveying (Byres Map) and selling of land, generating revenue of
£312,092 11 s 1d. Payments were by installment and deposit, instantly
creating indebtedness and payment default. New landowners escalate
importation and use of slaves and plantations. UK investment focusses on
defense and market trading: a coastal-strip was created as the ‘‘King’s
Three Chains’’—reserved for Government Buildings and an ideal trading
harbor, Portsmouth designed and laid out as the capital of Dominica but
thwarted by insect-borne disease bred in swamps
Honychurch (1995, 2017), Murdoch (1984),
Niddrie (1966), Byres (1776)
1778–1783 French colonial rule
1783–1832 Return to British rule by the Treaty of Versailles (as part of the Windward
Islands). Continued focus on defensive infrastructure and increasing
maroonage: slaves that use mountainous interior to hide and subsist. This
culminates in the Maroon Wars (1812–1815), punctuated by further
hurricane activity (Table 1)
Honychurch (1995, 2017), Welch (1968), House of
Commons (1815), Trouillot (1988)
1833–1838 Abolition of Slavery Act (1833) leads to full emancipation (1838) following
period of ‘‘apprenticeship.’’ Poverty amplified by hurricane and coffee
blight (Table 1) and land-use practice
Honychurch (1995, 2017), West India Royal
Commission (1898)
1850–1892 Dominica grouped in the Leeward Islands (1871). Local pull for economic
diversification on the island, combined with local evidence from Dr John
Imray encouraged lime cultivation, diversification further enhanced
development of Botanic Station (1884). Development hampered by lack of
investment in road infrastructure
Honychurch (1995), Nicholls (1894), Hamilton
(1894), West India Royal Commission (1897)
1893–1898 Three reports commissioned in response to poor economic performance and
poverty: (1) Royal Commission (‘‘Hamilton’’ Report, 1894) ‘‘into the
condition and affairs of the island of Dominica’’; (2) West India Royal
Commission (1898), analyzing the regional depression of the sugar
industry (report includes recommendations on growth of bananas and
limes, and infrastructure development); and (3) Naftel Report (1898),
commissioned by the local legislature, appraisal of island to attract
‘‘capitalists and intending colonists’’
Hamilton (1894), West India Royal Commission
(1897), Naftel (1898)
1900–1938 First World War—leads to drop in trade and increased price of food. Limited
export market for limes during depression/U.S. prohibition. Further
hurricanes and crop disease (Table 1)
1938–1950 Dominica moved to the Windward Islands Administrative Union. West India
Royal Commission (1938) to analyze regional social and economic
conditions (Moyne Commission). Action hampered by WWII, which also
reduced fishing due to hostile ships. Land purchase reform in favor of local
smallholders
West India Royal Commission (1945)
1950 Establishment of bananas as major crop (accounting for about 80% of all
exports by the 1960s)
1955–1967 Various developments in the island’s governance system leading up to
independence. These include the introduction of the Ministerial system
(1955) and the granting of Associated Statehood in 1967
1978 Full independence attained in November 1978 under a republican
constitution, based on the Westminster model. Strong hurricane in August
1979 (Table 1)
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4.1.1 A Focus on Monocrops
On Dominica a succession of coffee, sugar, cocoa, limes,
and bananas dominated as the main export crop at any one
time (Fig. 2a). Yet, the underlying assumption that
investment and development on any island would follow
from the profits from agriculture after land sales and
redistribution in the late 18th century proved untrue in
Dominica (Murdoch 1984; Trouillot 1988; Honychurch
2017). In 1894, an enquiry for the British government by
Commissioner, Sir Robert Hamilton noted that ‘‘Dominica,
though one of the most fertile of the British West Indian
Islands, is […] less developed […] and its inhabitants
appear less prosperous and contented’’ (Hamilton 1894, p.
v). Figure 2a illustrates the variations in economic output
for key crops for the period 1763–2016, as well as their
association with key hazardous events and crop disease.
Coffee, attractive for the relatively small scale of
investment in infrastructure needed and grown in the 18th
century by French smallholders, was the principal export
crop of Dominica until the 1830s, when a combination of
factors—including the emigration of French landowners,
deforestation, insect blight, a hurricane in 1834, and
increasing sugar prices—signaled its decline. Requests for
relief following the 1834 hurricane (House of Commons
1855) demonstrate the particular challenge associated with
the dual threat of long regrowth time (4 years) and disease
for the coffee bean growers in comparison to the large-
scale cane growers on neighboring islands. Sugarcane
production (regrowth in 6–12 months) consequently
increased (Fig. 2), but external political factors affected its
viability as well as the challenges posed by infrastructural
destruction caused by earthquakes and later hurricanes
(Table 1). This mountainous island was late in its devel-
opment of this previously lucrative crop: by 1854, the
Caribbean sugar crop was no longer protected by import
duties in Britain, and by 1874 sugar was being traded on
the free market (Fig. 2b). Cocoa temporarily filled the gap
in exports until many trees were destroyed during the
hurricanes of 1915 (minor) and 1916 (Nelson 2010).
Although growing cocoa required a relatively small
investment, this was offset by the long-term hurricane
impact, as cocoa takes longer to regrow (3–5 years). Limes
had been first explored as a possible alternative income
source in 1860 due to the value of lime products and the
diversity of markets for juice, oil, and extract. As sugar
declined in value, growth was encouraged and peaked in
the 1920s when lime accounted for over 80% of the
island’s total export value (Nelson 2010; Fig. 2a). How-
ever, disease, three hurricanes (1926, 1928 (smaller hurri-
canes), and 1930, Table 1) and a drop in lime market value
during U.S. prohibition and the global recession saw the
demise of lime production in Dominica (Fig. 2a). Bananas
were next. A report by the West India Royal Commission
(Morris 1897) had recommended Dominica establish fruit
trade (bananas) with North America, emulating trade
between Jamaica and New York. By 1953, this amounted
to 45% of all export values, surpassing citrus (Trouillot
1988). Bananas, referred to as ‘‘green gold’’ by Thompson
(1987), were the mainstay of Dominica’s economy until the
1990s (Fig. 2a), when, coupled with sporadic impacts from
hurricanes, preferential trade tariffs from the EU that had
existed since independence came to an end (Payne
2006, 2008; Fig. 2a).
Thus, the rise and demise of each export crop was
associated with a complex combination of disease, hazard,
and economic circumstances, leading to an increase or drop
in output. These factors often intersected cumulatively,
threatening the long-term sustainability of each successive
crop as a commercial enterprise. The cycle of rise and
demise resulted from an economy dominated by mono-
cultural agricultural practices on large plantation estates;
but it was not uniformly encouraged. Various reports rec-
ommended alternative practices, but there were barriers to
their implementation. By the end of the 19th century, the
British colonial powers began to express concern about the
island’s economic productivity, along with broader con-
cerns of maintaining production in the West Indies
(Hamilton 1894; West India Royal Commission 1897). The
overreliance on a few main crops for export and economic
prosperity, alongside the subsistence economy, was ques-
tioned in Dominica as it was in other parts of the Caribbean
(Barker 1993). Directed locally, the Hamilton (1894) and
Naftel (1898) reports both recommended crop diversifica-
tion and the encouragement of small landowners and
laborers to produce more than ‘‘provisions’’ (subsistence
crops). Dominica’s mountainous terrain had posed sys-
tematic challenges to agricultural development throughout
the colonial period. Significant infrastructural investment
was needed to unlock the agricultural potential of the
interior at any scale. However, land purchase and owner-
ship arrangements severely restricted this investment and
the encouragement of crop diversification. These arrange-
ments were rooted in the practice of surveying, valuation,
and sale of parcels of land for cultivation and profit, usually
via loans against the valuation of the land (1776 Byres
Map, Table 2). This economic system of plantation agri-
culture in the 18th century British West Indies ‘‘rested on a
complex and permanent system of borrowed capital, to
finance the establishment of plantations and short-term
loans to finance the year-on-year running costs, the resul-
tant debts being serviced out of the profits on each year’s
crop’’ (Murdoch 1984, p. 569). Although land sale of any
one plot was initially limited to lots of around 50 to 100
acres, this was easily circumvented by some purchasers
when early 18th century defaulters were forced to resell
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Fig. 2 a The boom and bust of coffee, sugar, lime, and banana
production in Dominica, 1763–2016. b Disaster impacts on sugar
export crops in three Eastern Caribbean volcanic islands, 1700–1937.
In a values are normalized against the year of peak productivity for
each crop. Conversions have been used for lime outputs as follows:
lime was exported in three main products at varying times—raw and
concentrated lime juice, citric acid, and lime essence. Until 1892
reporting discovered focused on the lime juice. From 1900 lime was
reported as its total export value across the three products. In the FAO
reporting (FAOSTAT 2019) it is declared as tons. Thus a conversion
was applied using the reported volume of juice and value equivalency
reported in Hamilton (1894). A conversion in this volume of around 1
gallon of concentrated juice per barrel of limes was used to determine
the no. of barrels that this was equivalent to in 1892 (33,148). In 1892
both the value and the amount (liquid mass) were reported. Using a
conversion of approximately 3 bushels per barrel and a registered
mass of limes as 80 lb in one bushel then this was converted to
* 4000 tons. Thus the 1961 to 2016 data were normalized to this
value to produce some equivalency with the earlier data. For values
reported in 1870–1875 these were also normalized to the 1892 value
suggesting these yields were\ 5% of the peak production value.
Cocoa export values were reported until 1896 (same sources) and
show an increase in the 1880s and 1890s. But as these are not fully
reported, so they are not reproduced here. Data gaps during the Wars
between the French and British (1776–1815) represent lack of
recording rather than lack of crops. In b values are normalized against
the year of peak productivity (as value in pounds, sterling) for each
island. Sources (a) Trouillot (1988, Chapter 3), Naftel (1898),
Hamilton (1894), Watts (1927), FAOSTAT (2019), Deer (1950);
(b) All data from Deer (1950)
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their land (Welch 1968). Later, this arrangement created
little incentive to quit the land permanently and thus repay
accumulated debts or to contribute to local taxes once
indebted.
There were, nonetheless, local and colonial efforts to
address these issues of weak crop diversification and
monopolies of land ownership. The Governor of Dominica,
J. R. Longden, exhorted the island’s Assembly in 1865 to
help secure land for the ‘‘peasantry’’ for cultivating
exports. A few decades later the Botanic Station in Roseau
started operating as a distribution center for plant species,
increasingly used by agricultural laborers. An instructor
trained by the Kew Botanic Gardens in London provided
information on new techniques and practices through the
Dominica Agricultural School, which opened in 1900, and
it quickly had an effect, enabling small ventures to flourish.
However, throughout this period, existing landowners
remained wary of ceding land to laborers. Thus, proposals
to promote diversification were often superseded by a
desire to attract further ‘‘capitalists and intending colo-
nists’’ (Naftel 1898) and the lure of profitability from an
individual crop that was attractive to external markets. As a
result, the promotion of the monoculture model prevailed
until the end of Dominica’s colonial period, justified
through reference to examples of its success in other (lar-
ger) Caribbean islands (Morris 1897), and partially driven
by the local tensions around land tenure and the need for
capital for infrastructural development as well as crop
diversification (see next section).
The outcome of insufficient investment in development
and a weak economy was further highlighted in reports
commissioned in 1927, 1939, and 1947, with the conclu-
sion that smallholders should be allowed to contribute to
the ‘‘banana economy’’ justified by preferential external
markets and high levels of profitability at that time (Orde
Browne 1939; West India Royal Commission 1945).
4.1.2 Lack of Investment in Road Infrastructure
Roseau has been the main settlement since before colonial
times when it was the seat of the Kalinago chief of leeward
Dominica (Honychurch 1995). Early British development
focused on the creation of Portsmouth, with a natural
harbor, as a capital but these plans were largely unrealized
because low-lying shore grounds were also a natural
breeding area for mosquitoes and associated diseases.
Further coastal development elsewhere was encouraged by
the creation of free lots for poor planters in the late 18th
century (also providing a ready militia for future defense).
In Dominica, the initial sale of land should have created
£326,022 of revenue by 1773, but managerial incompe-
tence and defaulted payments meant that less was realized
(Murdoch 1984). Some of this money was used to begin an
interior road in 1768 and 1769, and some £100,000 were
spent on fortifications as tensions remained high with the
French in the late 18th and early 19th centuries (Hony-
church 1995). The circular problem of a lack of agricultural
development (see previous section) and hence lack of
infrastructural development, was driven by a lack of profit,
and the implementation of unpopular tax regimes to try and
ensure that this investment happened. Unpaid debt from
initial land sales rapidly spiraled into rancor, and led to
further debt and uncertainty around obligations for infras-
tructural development and repayments, accentuated by
asset and income losses due to hazards and disease. Many
plots were completely inaccessible, with investors who
purchased them required to construct roads to access their
estates. The result was that most estates developed along
the coastal strip, while plots in the interior remained
inaccessible and undeveloped (Honychurch 1995). By
1893, road networks suitable for wheeled traffic consisted
of no more than 40 km around Roseau, of which 32 km
were unmetalled track (Hamilton 1894; Fig. 1). The lack of
roads separated smallholders from markets in Roseau, and
villages were obliged to operate largely self-sufficiently,
further encouraging coastal development.
During the 19th century, investment in roads and
infrastructure generally remained low as the British
Government attempted to ensure the colony was cost-
neutral to it in economic terms. A series of unpopular taxes
attempted to raise revenue for infrastructure in the mid-
19th century. Predicated on anticipated land values, these
fell disproportionately on the poor, without delivering
significant investment in road expansion. Roseau residents
were exempt from the Road Tax, encouraging movement to
the margins of the capital (Hamilton 1894). Around the
turn of the century two major attempts were made to tackle
road infrastructure, with the first started in 1888, financed
by £40,000 in loans and increased taxes. Progress was
prevented by the combined influences of incompetent
engineering and severe flooding in 1891 (Hamilton 1894).
In the early 1900s, the construction of the first 12-mile
stage of the trans-insular road (known as the Imperial
Road) was completed with a £12,000 grant from the British
government (Honychurch 1995; Fig. 1). The planned route
for the road up the Layou valley was changed to allow
access to a private estate purchased at the time by a
wealthy investor. The revised route was controversial,
requiring an additional 300 m of ascent (Hulme 2000), but
the route remains a key road link through the island to the
present day. The road opened up a swathe of interior land,
resulting in an investment of £40,000 (according to the
papers of H. Hesketh Bell, Governor of the Leeward
Islands, 1912–1916) (Hulme 2000). However, the estates
largely fell into disrepair during the 1920s due to low
productivity and problems paying for maintenance of the
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road (Hulme 2000). These early difficulties point to the
importance of not just high impact hazardous events but
also the challenges posed by low-grade hazardous activities
(heavy rainfall and landslides) in creating and sustaining
suitable infrastructure.
The 1950s and 1960s saw a concentrated program of
road building to complete the major roads as well as the
feeder road network (Fig. 1). These feeder roads allowed
the Crown Lands in the interior to be accessed and sold to
smallholders for banana cultivation. The trans-insular road
linking the east and west coasts was completed in 1956,
and a road linking the main urban centers of Roseau and
Portsmouth was opened in 1972 (Honychurch 1995),
financed initially by the Colonial Development and Wel-
fare Office. Infrastructure upgrades have unlocked the
agricultural potential of the island to small-scale farmers,
but much of this expansion occurred during a period of
minimal storm activity, so roads were not built to withstand
hurricane impacts. The cost of maintaining these roads in
the face of more frequent tropical storms and hurricanes in
recent years has been a considerable challenge.
4.2 Consequences of Exposure to Hazards
Historical factors have exacerbated the exposure of people,
livelihood assets, and infrastructure to hazard impacts. This
section discusses how land tenure patterns have created
spatial marginalization of the poorer sections of society to
hazardous locations, and how badly situated critical
infrastructure has resulted in high levels of exposure.
4.2.1 Changing Knowledge of Hazard Environment
A critical first step in reducing the physical accumulation
of risk is producing knowledge of likely risks and their
impacts. Such knowledge is built upon recognizing patterns
in hazardous activities at different temporal and spatial
scales. The first scale is the changing conditions that may
signal hazardous events over coming hours or days, and the
second is the recognition of seasonal or even decadal
changes in likelihood of hazard occurrence. Phenomena
may be recognized or anticipated at differing spatial
scales—for example a localized association of unsta-
ble slopes or flooding with intense rainfall; or the knowl-
edge that intense earthquake or hurricane impacts may be
widely felt; or the recognition of particular geographic
areas less prone to particular hazardous phenomena. In this
analysis we are not so much concerned with the historical
evolution of the understanding of causal mechanisms
behind hazardous phenomena, but rather we focus on his-
torical changes in the recognition of patterns in hazards and
impacts, and the extent to which this may have helped
communities and decision makers to reduce exposure to
risk from physical hazards (referred to as ‘‘effective hazard
knowledge’’).
There is archaeological evidence (Burke and Lovell
2000; Honychurch 1995) and some historical evidence that
the Kalinago lived in dispersed, relatively small settle-
ments across the island, and each settlement had a rela-
tively small sphere of influence on nearby land used for
subsistence farming. Schwartz (2015) and Mulcahy (2008)
have argued that this dispersed pattern of settlements also
distributed the collective impacts of any one storm, and
that land use in coastal areas particularly prone to storm
surge was restricted. These practices were mirrored by
early colonial settlers and smallholders (Schwartz 2015;
Honychurch 2017).
Evidence indicates that there was good indigenous
understanding of storm seasonality, and of key warning
signs of the imminent arrival of a hurricane—drop of wind,
changed animal behavior, and unusual aural phenomena
around the moon (Mulcahy 2008; Schwartz 2015).
Descriptions of early European encounters with these
populations suggest these warning signs were taken seri-
ously and were also adopted by the early modern colonists.
While on some occasions interpretation of these ‘‘signs’’
may have created false alarms, their recognition encour-
ages mitigation against storm impacts on the time scale of a
few hours and long-term adaptations in terms of agricul-
tural practice. However, early colonists introduced a dif-
ferent system of land ownership, demarcated and improved
land by cutting down trees, creating fences, and building
westernized housing structures, which rapidly increased
vulnerability of individuals and assets to storms. But by the
early 18th century significant adaptations in building styles
were already recognizable, creating more resilience to
hurricanes, reducing the impacts of earthquakes and
improving ventilation, thus reducing the potential to incu-
bate disease (Mulcahy 2008).
The use of indigenous knowledge—‘‘ignorant country
people and barbarous nations, are better observers of times
and seasons, and draw better rules from them, than more
civilized and reasoning people, for they rely more on
experience than theories,’’ Captain Langfords Observations
in Mulcahy (2008, p. 54)—and a relatively well-connected
regional trading network quickly led to the recognition of
the variety of hazards to be confronted on the island, par-
ticularly drought, rain storms, hurricanes, and earthquakes.
Regionally, there was a recognition of a geographic dis-
tribution of the likelihood of hurricane events (Schwartz
2015); short-time and long-time forecasting was incorpo-
rated into trading and military patterns and behavior. As
emphasized by Mulcahy (2008, p. 34), by the end of the
17th century ‘‘colonists no longer viewed hurricanes
‘strange’ and ‘unusual’ but saw them as routine and
expected,’’ with a well-defined seasonality. This
123
Barclay et al. Historical Trajectories of Disaster Risk in Dominica
knowledge could have informed mitigative or adaptive
strategies even in the absence of a detailed understanding
of the causes of such hazards and of accurate modern
forecasting.
However, effective knowledge of some other hazards
was more patchy, including hazards with longer recurrence
intervals (for example, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions),
and fewer warning signals (earthquakes). Knowledge of
these phenomena improved as documentation and means of
communication increased through the 19th and 20th cen-
turies (so learning from one area might be applied else-
where) and is one area where the ‘‘regionalized’’ colonial
governance may have been a useful means by which to
achieve this. Extensive hazards such as droughts and
landslides were also remarked upon but generally consid-
ered as an additional nuisance in realizing infrastructural
projects or sustaining productivity (see Sect. 4.1.2).
Hazard exposure may also have been influenced by
natural variability in some phenomena. Fifty- to seventy-
year cycles in hurricane activity in the Caribbean have
been recognized, associated with multi-decadal variations
in North Atlantic Sea Surface Temperature (Chenoweth
and Divine 2008, 2012) and with further variance imposed
on shorter time scales. These translate into periods of lower
hazard occurrence and activity across the region and on any
one island, on the time scales in some instances of a human
lifetime and in many cases at least of a political cycle (see
Sect. 4.1.2).
Effective hazard knowledge, which had the potential to
be deployed to reduce risk exposure, was available and
shared at least from the 16th century onwards, improving
through the 18th and 19th centuries. But in the Caribbean,
where use of the land and sea became dominated by con-
stant market forces, the temptation to ignore mitigative or
adaptive strategies for such discrete and intermittent
impacts of hazards as indicated here was perhaps stronger.
4.2.2 Restricted Access to Land
After 1763, with the parceling of land following the Byres
survey, the twin demands of trade and security played a
stronger role in settlement location with a need to create
infrastructure such as roads and fortifications. The restric-
tions on land use and availability of small holdings for
successive generations described here have not only made
the economy more susceptible to natural hazards, it has
also caused much of the population to be concentrated in
locations with heightened exposure despite knowledge of
that potential exposure. In complex ways this process is
tied to the legacy of emancipation.
In 1838, when freedom from slavery was granted, the
colonial government pursued an intentional policy to keep
‘‘former slaves’’ from owning land. In 1836, Lord Glenelg,
Secretary of State for the Colonies had sought to maintain
levels of labor on colonial estates in order to ensure eco-
nomic stability for Britain. An effective way of ensuring
this was to financially and structurally ‘‘impede’’ the
acquisition of land by free slaves, and therefore force them
into estate labor for survival (Honychurch 2017). In the late
18th century the decision to sell land to the highest bidder
above a set minimum price kept most people as landless
laborers (Trouillot 1988). Although the colonial poor were
somewhat accommodated, landless black laborers were
caught in a vicious circle until as late as 1945, as purchase
of less than 40 acres of land was not permitted, and wages
were kept low. In the 1950s, Crown Lands were sold to
smallholders, and were located inland from the colonial
estates (Honychurch 1995).
After emancipation, landless former slaves who wished
to grow their own provisions had no choice but to settle
illegally where they found unoccupied land. Illegal settle-
ment was particularly concentrated in coastal areas within
the King’s Three Chains (a 66 yard wide coastal strip)
defined by John Byres in the 1760s.
Some estate owners with land near the King’s Three
Chains attempted to eject ‘‘squatters,’’ but these attempts
often revealed a lack of clarity over estate boundaries and
land tenure, and in some instances, estates tacitly endorsed
these processes. As a result, laborers remained on land
where no eviction action was taken, which explains some
of the crowded beachfront communities on the west coast
of Dominica (Honychurch 2017). Many of these beachfront
communities are today exposed to coastal hazards. For
example, Pointe Michel was one of the hardest hit com-
munities by Hurricane Maria in 2017.
4.2.3 Expansion of the Road Network into Hazardous
Places
Dominica’s public infrastructure is highly exposed to nat-
ural hazards and became increasingly so during the 20th
century as infrastructure expanded to serve communities
along the coast and in ravines as urban settlements
expanded. The origin of this high exposure lies in the
colonial partitioning of land and the post-emancipation
settlement described above, and investments in infrastruc-
ture have followed these settlement patterns. As a housing
officer in the Government of Dominica1 explained:
Runaway slaves moved away from the plantation and
set up shop in these mountain top areas. Over the
years, generations and people continued to reside
there and Governments over the years have gone in
and brought in roads and other amenities.
1 Interview took place in Roseau, Dominica on 15 March 2017.
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The road network (Fig. 1) expanded rapidly between 1950
and 2018 including the completion of the trans-insular
road, the road linking the two main settlements of Roseau
and Portsmouth and subsequent creation of feeder roads
took place to service the smallholders participating in
banana cultivation. The road network consists of 566 km of
main and secondary roads, 338 km of feeder roads, and 200
bridges. The roads traverse unavoidably steep landslide-
prone slopes and flood-prone river crossings in order to
serve communities strung out along the original King’s
Three Chains settled by emancipated slaves. These feeder
roads place a substantial burden on the government in
terms of both general maintenance and repair following
both extreme and annual weather events. In 2009, a road
condition assessment showed that about 24% of the main
roads and 90% of the secondary, urban, and feeder roads
were categorized as in poor or bad condition. In 2015,
Tropical Storm Erika damaged or destroyed 40% of roads
and 50% of bridges (Government of the Commonwealth of
Dominica 2015).
The expansion of the road network coincided with a
relatively quiet period in terms of numbers of hurricanes,
so ensuring structures could withstand the high wind
speeds and flooding associated with high-impact events
may not have been considered a high priority at that time
(Benson et al. 2001). Limited grant funding and a major
infrastructure deficit may have incentivized a least-cost
approach to road design and construction, which has left
Dominica with a legacy of rapidly deteriorating roads.
Roseau, as the capital, has become a significant port,
despite exposure to wave action during storms. At least six
jetties near Roseau have existed at various times, and, in
turn, been destroyed by hurricanes (Honychurch 1995).
Dominica’s first and only deepwater port at Woodbridge
Bay, north of Roseau, opened in 1978. In 1979, this facility
was extensively damaged by Hurricane David, with a
rehabilitation cost estimated at 41% of the total original
project cost. Strengthening of part of the jetty against
swells in 1996 was vindicated following Hurricane Lenny
in 1999, which damaged only the unreinforced part of the
jetty deck. The port continued to operate following Lenny,
providing the only lifeline berthing facility (Benson et al.
2001).
Historical decision-making processes have therefore
exacerbated exposure to hazards in several important ways.
Firstly, the development of settlements in hazard-prone
locations can be traced back to colonial times and partic-
ularly emancipation, when settlement in highly exposed
coastal locations and marginal Crown Lands occurred.
Secondly, some of the poorest and most marginal settle-
ments are relatively isolated and particularly vulnerable to
disasters. Thirdly, the late development of roads, air- and
seaports during the 1950s to the 1970s, a period of
infrequent hurricanes, may have disincentivized designs
capable of withstanding the type of extreme events seen in
the latter part of the 20th and early 21st centuries.
4.3 Disaster Response, Relief, and Governance
Historical practices of response and relief over time have
also acted to create deep-rooted structures and expectations
that resonate today. Under colonial rule, island adminis-
trators and communities on Dominica responded to disas-
ters by requesting assistance from the Crown Estate in
Britain, which in turn, provided ad hoc grants and loans that
drew on the already complex system of borrowed capital
with which the colony was established by the British
Government. Although intended to facilitate the economic
and social recovery of both private landowners and public
infrastructure, these actions were also rooted in the primary
function of the British Empire at the time, that is maxi-
mizing profit for the UK while minimizing debt burden.
Loans after the 1834 hurricane and the 1843 earthquake, for
example, involved lengthy correspondence (through a
hierarchy of governance layers), usually required repay-
ment, and frequently accrued substantial interest. These
loans were not distributed equitably, and repayment was
often renegotiated, sometimes formally and sometimes on
an ad hoc basis. This led to an emphasis on backward
looking repayment and recovery in response to past disaster,
rather than on the creation of incentives to invest, learn, and
prepare for future problems, despite over 100 years of
reporting and analysis that advocated for alternative path-
ways and good hazard knowledge (Hamilton 1894; West
India Royal Commission 1898, 1945; Benson et al. 2001).
Moreover, loan systems were also frequently homoge-
nized under common administrative pathways for several
islands. Thus islands recovering from the impacts of a
hazardous event could find themselves with similar terms
and loan agreements to an island dealing with the afteref-
fects of, for example, a slave rebellion, arguing retro-
spectively for the specific nature of their need. A second
outcome from this was the practice of less formal pathways
to economic recovery via diaspora, absentee landlords, and
‘‘in kind’’ or actual support from neighboring islands with
some resources to spare.
4.3.1 A Short-Sighted Response to the 1834 Hurricane
This amplification of disaster impacts because of complex
administrative and financial responses is best illustrated
through a detailed example of the 1834 hurricane, for
which an estimated £291,500 of losses were incurred
(House of Commons 1855). Responses in the decades
following this event were both bureaucratic and ineffective
in terms of creating a self-sufficient recovery, failing to
123
Barclay et al. Historical Trajectories of Disaster Risk in Dominica
provide a spur to sustainable economic growth and no
incentive to break with the monocultural model of pro-
duction. Initial response and requests after the 1834 hur-
ricane focused on alleviating civil expenditure and
providing tax breaks (the initial 1835 Relief Bill allowed
duty free imports of lumber, shingles, flour, beef, pork, and
fish for a few months). The island was granted £80,000 (by
session 5&6 Will.4, c51; House of Commons 1855) and of
this, £10,000 were loaned for public services and a total of
£66,950 were loaned to estate proprietors in the form of 64
individual loans. However, this came from a reallocation of
the West Indies Loan Act (House of Commons 1832),
where £1 million had been allocated to Jamaica, Barbados,
St. Vincent, and St. Lucia for hurricane relief and dealing
with ‘‘insurrection.’’ These loans, provided through the
newly formed West Indies Relief Commission, were at
lower interest rates (3% originally), secured by mortgages,
with interest payments charged against future estate rev-
enue, mirroring commercial practice in the private credit
market (Smith 2012). Little direct support was given to
slaves or anyone of mixed race, but local government
agents received grant-in-aid at low cost for the benefit of
the general population to coordinate supplies of shelter,
food, and clothing (Smith 2012).
Public debts and interest, and private interest accruing
were then variably repaid until a damaging earthquake in
1843 generated claims of £8000–£10,000 in damage to the
whole island. The Subsequent Relief Act offered further
loans up to a total value of £50,000 to Dominica for a
three-year period at 4% interest. This setback, exacerbated
by the 1846 Sugar Duties Act, which equalized import
duties on sugar from British colonies (West Indian colonies
had been favored by lower sugar import duties since 1814)
meant that loans were no longer repaid and debts accu-
mulated. By 1855, outstanding public loans were calcu-
lated at £7002, while loans on estates now totaled £92,352.
Further amendments to the Relief Act were created in
1848, 1860, and 1867, to accommodate differing repay-
ment terms and incorporate the payback on further loans
(Hamilton 1894). Arguments for the particularity of
Dominica centered on the impacts on the coffee industry,
amplified by longer disease and regrowth time for coffee
bushes (and cocoa trees) in comparison to sugarcane
(House of Commons 1855). Detailed correspondence
reveals the compounding issues of increasing agricultural
and freight costs, the financial impacts of troop withdrawal
on local markets and the readjustment of sugar. By 1878,
the West India Relief Commission was wound up and there
was a remission of most unpaid loans. The decision was
taken that some loans could not be repaid because payment
depended on profit from plantations, which had been sub-
stantially reduced. Eventually, with the 1879 West India
Loans Bill, all private (estate owners’) outstanding loans
were written off, and the last payment for the outstanding
public services loan (£1527 of the £10,000 advanced) was
in 1880. Attention then returned to the means by which
Dominica could once again become profitable (Hamilton
1894).
The balance of loans and grants over time show a con-
sistent pattern of requests for financial assistance from the
Lieutenant-Governor of the island followed by inability to
make repayments, patterns that are repeated in analyses
through the 20th century (West India Royal Commission
1945; Benson et al. 2001). The time scale of loan repay-
ment often exceeds the time scale over which the next
environmental or social calamity occurred. Despite the
geographical, cultural, and historical diversity of the Car-
ibbean islands, the approaches to requesting repayment of
loans by the British Government were similar and uniform.
Islands that were not performing well in terms of exports
and profits were managed by following the pattern of
colonial development established on others. But island
governors and British-commissioned reviews argued for
recognition of the particularities of individual islands. The
legacy of unpaid loans (despite remission of most by the
early 1880s) continued to be felt, through difficulties in
reestablishing profitable agricultural outputs and fit-for-
purpose infrastructure at the end of the century and beyond,
as discussed in previous sections. Deeply entrenched pat-
terns of post hoc requests for remission from debt and
hardship set in, rather than forward looking arguments for
radical change.
4.3.2 The Post-Colonial Disaster Management Legacy
After independence, a more proactive, cyclical approach to
preparing for hurricanes and storms began to emerge in
Dominica. The government set up a National Office of
Disaster Management (ODM) within the Ministry of
Communications, Works and Housing (MCWH) following
the devastating impact of Hurricanes David and Frederick
in 1979. In 1996, a National Disaster Plan was finally
published, with a detailed set of actions and responsibilities
for disaster preparedness and emergency response. But this
plan did not directly address the need to reduce levels of
exposure and economic vulnerability over the longer
term—and despite frequent disasters and devastating
impacts (including Hurricane Allen in 1980, Hugo in 1989,
three tropical storms in 1995, and Hurricane Lenny in
1999), little thought was given in post-disaster response
and recovery to reducing future risk.2
2 The National Disaster Plan issued in 1996 and updated in 2001
describes recovery as a phase of the disaster management cycle and
establishes an Economic Stability Task Force to ensure plans are
made for the recovery of the economy, but there are no regulations or
guidance on how those plans should be developed.
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The Dominica government responded to frequent dis-
asters in the 1980s and 1990s by reallocating parts of the
budget to pay for relief and rehabilitation, which alongside
the damage to banana crops and loss of export earnings,
intensified budgetary pressures that were already severe
due to oil price rises and other shocks (Benson et al. 2001).
Dominica, to this day, continues to be an agrarian-based
economy with a weak transport infrastructure network that
is highly vulnerable to hurricanes and other hazards.
Decisions about economic development over the last
40 years have largely ignored the impacts of disasters and
the need to diversify into more resilient productive activ-
ities. Some diversification has occurred reducing reliance
on one expert crop, but this has occurred mainly within the
agriculture sector, and there has been little deliberate effort
to reduce the overall hazard vulnerability of Dominica’s
economy (Benson et al. 2001).
Dominica continues to suffer from the underinvestment
in road infrastructure during colonial era. An important
increase in capital expenditure in the 1980s following
Hurricane David was needed to rehabilitate roads, but also
because the country’s infrastructure was already in a poor
condition due to years of inadequate maintenance and low
investment. This increase in expenditure deepened levels of
debt.
Dominica is heavily reliant on external aid when dis-
asters occur, and this creates inefficiencies in disaster
response and recovery. Delays in aid disbursement due to
limited local administrative capacity and inability to meet
funding requirements severely affected the government’s
capacity to respond effectively (Benson et al. 2001).
After independence, several reports and tailored advice
for reducing disaster risk in Dominica were commissioned
by international agencies and produced by external con-
sultants. These focus on the specific needs of the island and
provide concrete sets of recommendations around using
risk information in development planning so as to focus
investment on more resilient infrastructure and the diver-
sification out of agriculture (see, for example, Benson et al.
2001), but these had little influence on disaster policy in
Dominica until Tropical Storm Erika in 2015. After a
period of relative calm, Erika caused significant damage,
killing 30 people and making it the nation’s worst disaster
since Hurricane David. Dominica saw an influx of inter-
national assistance, but also detailed impact studies with
far-reaching recommendations.3 This generated some
political interest, at least in the immediate aftermath of the
storm, to take action to reduce disaster impacts in the
future. But recovery was slow, and two years later
Dominica was devastated by Hurricane Maria, a category 5
hurricane, which caused total losses of approximately USD
930.9 million, and undid much of the rehabilitation effort
following Tropical Storm Erika. With all eyes on the
Caribbean, the Prime Minister of Dominica, Roosevelt
Skerrit, committed his country to becoming ‘‘the world’s
first climate resilient nation.’’ Achieving this will require
serious reflection on the appropriateness of current land use
and the resilience of agricultural practices and infrastruc-
ture, and will need a new nationally owned, investment-
driven recovery model (Wilkinson 2018).
5 Conclusions
This article presents an analysis of historical social, eco-
nomic, and political processes that have had overwhelming
implications for Dominica’s development trajectory.
Notwithstanding the severe challenges posed by the
island’s geographical location, topography, and exposure to
multiple forms of hazard, lessons can be drawn from an
historical analysis to inform recovery planning and help
manage risks more effectively in the future.
This article underscores the role that seemingly unre-
lated social, economic, and political processes can play in
generating disaster risk for decades to come. In Dominica,
this can be seen in decisions taken at the beginning of
British colonial rule. These include: the division and sale of
land; decisions about labor and land use at the time of
emancipation; coastal zoning and the establishment of the
King’s Three Chains; road construction; and the pursuit of
an export-led economic development model, based around
large plantations with the aim of generating economic
surplus from the colonies (with the largely unfulfilled
expectation that these profits would lead to private
investment in infrastructure). All these decisions, actions,
and policies had serious implications for the local economy
and the freed slave populations at the time and set
Dominica on a trajectory of accumulating hazard exposure
and high economic vulnerability.
Natural hazards have played a dominant role in the
island’s development or lack of it, despite good knowledge
of the occurrence and severity of many of these hazards.
Severe hazard events have occurred with such frequency
(and often coinciding) that economic recovery has been
repeatedly set back, yet little attention has been paid in
economic policy to the potential impacts of natural haz-
ards. An important but previously less studied impact is the
attritional impact of hazards such as landslides and slope
instability that increase year-to-year costs of creating or
sustaining infrastructure and make recovery from intensive
events harder. These are particularly acute on the
3 See, for example, the rapid damage and impact assessment
conducted by a World Bank mission in Dominica: ‘‘Rapid Damage
and Impact Assessment Tropical Storm Erika – August 27, 2015, A
Report by the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica.’’
September 25, 2015.
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mountainous ‘‘volcanic islands.’’ When disasters hit
Dominica, landowners took on high levels of debt to
replace lost assets, but when crops failed to recover, loans
could not be repaid, and indebtedness increased, deepening
their vulnerability to further shocks, and rendering the
economic model less viable. This pattern of disasters
devastating crops and reducing exports, followed by a
colonial response that further undermined development,
has been repeated without prompting any changes in
agricultural policies or post-disaster aid. Despite the fact
that the colonial export-led model of development was
inappropriate for Dominica, the model was not modified. It
was assumed that the same things would work for all
Caribbean islands despite critical differences in physical
geography and timing of economic development that
would suggest otherwise. After independence, the export-
led model based principally on agricultural exports con-
tinued (albeit with further land division and smaller pro-
duction units), with the addition of tourism and a small
financial services sector. Dominica has been less successful
than many other Caribbean islands in these economic
activities, largely due to limited tourist infrastructure
(Boxill and Severin 2004).
Yet, lessons can be learned from disasters, and ‘‘mis-
takes’’ avoided if the right questions are asked about who
was affected and why recovery processes were slower than
anticipated. Concrete policy advice for the present and
future can be deduced from structural knowledge about the
past (Schenk 2015). In the aftermath of Hurricane Maria,
the government and the private sector face the
inevitable pressures of pursuing rapid recovery, yet
politicians have also called for a reduction in longer-term
disaster risk, and Dominica has set the ambition to become
the first climate resilient nation. This requires consideration
of not only recent events but the cumulative impacts of past
disasters on people and economic development in
Dominica. A proactive, longer-term approach is needed, as
one local government commissioner4 admitted:
We have to take a more proactive global kind of
approach to really understand Dominica as a whole:
what are the risk factors and the level of exposure;
and what are the best policy decisions to really
address a more long-term solution? The reality is, as a
small island developing state, you really have major
economic challenges… Sometimes the easier way out
is to be reactive. Something happens you respond; but
it’s not very sustainable. So, you respond to [hurri-
cane] David…and [hurricane] Lenny comes…and as
you responded to Lenny, you get an Erika.
New planning instruments are needed to support develop-
ment away from rivers and coasts and to include local
populations in these plans. Today, Dominica’s low-income
families continue to live in informal settlements along what
was Crown Land, in river valleys and on the margins of
urban centers, highly exposed to floods and erosion, and
easily cut off by damage to the one coastal road linking
them together. These settlements were severely impacted
by Tropical Storm Erika and Hurricane Maria, with many
houses being completely destroyed as a result of river
flooding (Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica
2017).
An important finding from this study is that decisions
about access to land, and ownership patterns that
marginalize the poor and accentuate inequalities, also
create disaster risk and constrain development. They are as
critical as the decisions and investments taken intentionally
to manage risk—such as the development of early warning
systems and preparedness plans. Recognizing these his-
torical drivers of risk is key if Dominica is to avoid taking
decisions in the future that will undermine and compromise
efforts to build the island’s resilience.
This situation is not unique to Dominica, and a similar
analysis of the precise historical factors that have shaped
development would be beneficial for other Caribbean
islands and SIDS with colonial histories. A larger and
broader study would enable comparisons to be analyzed,
and enable patterns—if they are present—to emerge.
Disaster research rarely considers past events or deci-
sions taken further back than the very recent past. This can
result in superficial sets of recommendations that fail to
recognize the deep structural problems, and their ongoing
consequences, that need to be understood and addressed to
reduce disaster risk effectively and build future resilience.
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